summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorMike Kaganski <mike.kaganski@collabora.com>2023-11-09 16:12:45 +0300
committerMiklos Vajna <vmiklos@collabora.com>2023-11-13 09:32:04 +0100
commit17de201275120f2644b97a269f38d16b24bcadae (patch)
tree47d4f092fb62255ec52235041f644a32c45383ac
parente3743e615d094b51db76d52b77efcd4a74265beb (diff)
Fix USE_CONFIG_APPROVE_CONFIRMATION and USE_CONFIG_REJECT_CONFIRMATION
They still showed UI in case of signed macros. Two decisions were made, to improve security of USE_CONFIG_APPROVE_CONFIRMATION: 1. In case of High macro security mode, valid but untrusted certificate will be automatically rejected (because it is not safe to automatically add trusted certificates) - so in this mode, USE_CONFIG_APPROVE_CONFIRMATION is the same as USE_CONFIG_REJECT_CONFIRMATION; 2. In case of Medium macro security mode, valid but untrusted certificate will not automatically allow macros execution, but will proceed to the following checks - which on Windows will try to check the source's Security Zone, and may disallow macros based on that. Only after Security Zone check the macros will be automatically allowed. Change-Id: I1a9c92c6b940b689599c5d106798ecfc691dad46 Reviewed-on: https://gerrit.libreoffice.org/c/core/+/159214 Tested-by: Jenkins Reviewed-by: Mike Kaganski <mike.kaganski@collabora.com> Reviewed-on: https://gerrit.libreoffice.org/c/core/+/159278 Reviewed-by: Miklos Vajna <vmiklos@collabora.com>
-rw-r--r--sfx2/source/doc/docmacromode.cxx26
1 files changed, 20 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/sfx2/source/doc/docmacromode.cxx b/sfx2/source/doc/docmacromode.cxx
index 80c1908fd787..37871e0e170a 100644
--- a/sfx2/source/doc/docmacromode.cxx
+++ b/sfx2/source/doc/docmacromode.cxx
@@ -213,9 +213,12 @@ namespace sfx2
// should not ask any confirmations. FROM_LIST_AND_SIGNED_WARN should only allow
// trusted signed macros at this point; so it may only ask for confirmation to add
// certificates to trusted, and shouldn't show UI when trusted list is read-only.
- const bool bAllowUI = nMacroExecutionMode != MacroExecMode::FROM_LIST_AND_SIGNED_NO_WARN
- && (nMacroExecutionMode == MacroExecMode::ALWAYS_EXECUTE
- || !SvtSecurityOptions::IsReadOnly(SvtSecurityOptions::EOption::MacroTrustedAuthors));
+ const bool bAllowUI
+ = nMacroExecutionMode != MacroExecMode::FROM_LIST_AND_SIGNED_NO_WARN
+ && eAutoConfirm == eNoAutoConfirm
+ && (nMacroExecutionMode == MacroExecMode::ALWAYS_EXECUTE
+ || !SvtSecurityOptions::IsReadOnly(
+ SvtSecurityOptions::EOption::MacroTrustedAuthors));
const bool bHasTrustedMacroSignature = m_xData->m_rDocumentAccess.hasTrustedScriptingSignature(bAllowUI ? rxInteraction : nullptr);
if (bHasTrustedMacroSignature)
@@ -227,9 +230,20 @@ namespace sfx2
|| nSignatureState == SignatureState::NOTVALIDATED )
{
// there is valid signature, but it is not from the trusted author
- // this case includes explicit reject from user in the UI in cases of
- // FROM_LIST_AND_SIGNED_WARN and ALWAYS_EXECUTE
- return disallowMacroExecution();
+ if (eAutoConfirm == eAutoConfirmApprove
+ && nMacroExecutionMode == MacroExecMode::ALWAYS_EXECUTE)
+ {
+ // For ALWAYS_EXECUTE + eAutoConfirmApprove (USE_CONFIG_APPROVE_CONFIRMATION
+ // in Medium security mode), do not approve it right here; let Security Zone
+ // check below do its job first.
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ // All other cases of valid but untrusted signatures should result in denied
+ // macros here. This includes explicit reject from user in the UI in cases
+ // of FROM_LIST_AND_SIGNED_WARN and ALWAYS_EXECUTE
+ return disallowMacroExecution();
+ }
}
// Other values of nSignatureState would result in either rejected macros
// (FROM_LIST_AND_SIGNED_*), or a confirmation.