Fix signature overflow check in the NSS case

We didn't actually check this correctly at all, but gladly overwrote the
allocated part of the output PDF, thus obviously rendering it invalid.

The parameter passed to PORT_NewArea is a default chunk size, not a maximum
anything, so it was misleading, even if not wrong as such, to pass
MAX_SIGNATURE_CONTENT_LENGTH to it. Use 10000 instead.

No need to do the overflow check twice in the Win32 case.

Change-Id: Ifa796dbb74b32e857f7184c1e8ada97ba124b020

1 files changed, 11 insertions, 11 deletions

diff --git a/vcl/source/gdi/pdfwriter_impl.cxx b/vcl/source/gdi/pdfwriter_impl.cxx
index 838a8826257d..55a918b864df 100644
--- a/vcl/source/gdi/pdfwriter_impl.cxx
+++ b/vcl/source/gdi/pdfwriter_impl.cxx
@@ -6916,7 +6916,7 @@ bool PDFWriterImpl::finalizeSignature()
         SECItem ts_cms_output;
         ts_cms_output.data = 0;
         ts_cms_output.len = 0;
-        PLArenaPool *ts_arena = PORT_NewArena(MAX_SIGNATURE_CONTENT_LENGTH);
+        PLArenaPool *ts_arena = PORT_NewArena(10000);
         NSSCMSEncoderContext *ts_cms_ecx;
         ts_cms_ecx = NSS_CMSEncoder_Start(ts_cms_msg, NULL, NULL, &ts_cms_output, ts_arena, PDFSigningPKCS7PasswordCallback, pass, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
 
@@ -7199,7 +7199,7 @@ bool PDFWriterImpl::finalizeSignature()
     SECItem cms_output;
     cms_output.data = 0;
     cms_output.len = 0;
-    PLArenaPool *arena = PORT_NewArena(MAX_SIGNATURE_CONTENT_LENGTH);
+    PLArenaPool *arena = PORT_NewArena(10000);
     NSSCMSEncoderContext *cms_ecx;
 
     // Possibly it would work to even just pass NULL for the password callback function and its
@@ -7233,11 +7233,20 @@ bool PDFWriterImpl::finalizeSignature()
     }
 #endif
 
+    if (cms_output.len*2 > MAX_SIGNATURE_CONTENT_LENGTH)
+    {
+        SAL_WARN("vcl.pdfwriter", "Signature requires more space (" << cms_output.len*2 << ") than we reserved (" << MAX_SIGNATURE_CONTENT_LENGTH << ")");
+        NSS_CMSMessage_Destroy(cms_msg);
+        return false;
+    }
+
     OStringBuffer cms_hexbuffer;
 
     for (unsigned int i = 0; i < cms_output.len ; i++)
         appendHex(cms_output.data[i], cms_hexbuffer);
 
+    assert(cms_hexbuffer.getLength() <= MAX_SIGNATURE_CONTENT_LENGTH);
+
     // Set file pointer to the m_nSignatureContentOffset, we're ready to overwrite PKCS7 object
     nWritten = 0;
     CHECK_RETURN( (osl::File::E_None == m_aFile.setPos(osl_Pos_Absolut, m_nSignatureContentOffset)) );
@@ -7395,15 +7404,6 @@ bool PDFWriterImpl::finalizeSignature()
             return false;
         }
 
-        if (nTsSigLen*2 > MAX_SIGNATURE_CONTENT_LENGTH)
-        {
-            SAL_WARN("vcl.pdfwriter", "Signature requires more space (" << nTsSigLen*2 << ") than we reserved (" << MAX_SIGNATURE_CONTENT_LENGTH << ")");
-            CryptMsgClose(hDecodedMsg);
-            CryptMsgClose(hMsg);
-            CertFreeCertificateContext(pCertContext);
-            return false;
-        }
-
         SAL_INFO("vcl.pdfwriter", "nTsSigLen=" << nTsSigLen);
 
         boost::scoped_array<BYTE> pTsSig(new BYTE[nTsSigLen]);